Variability and the tragedy of the commune
Ake Brannstrom, T. Gross, B. Blasius, and U. Dieckmann.
12月18日（火）13：30〜 理学部3号館6階数理生物学セミナー室
(at Room 3631, 6th floor of building 3 of the Faculty of Sciences)
Studies of cooperation have traditionally revolved around discrete
games such as the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, where players choose
between two pure strategies, cooperation and defection. With
increasing frequency, however, cooperation is being studied using
continuous games with a continuum of strategies representing the level
of cooperative investment. For the continuous Snow Drift game it has
been shown that with small mutational steps, a monomorphic population
may undergo evolutionary branching often resulting in the emergence of
a defector strategy that coexist with the cooperating strategy. This
phenomena has been dubbed `the tragedy of the commune'. We study the
effect of variability in group size on the tragedy of the commune and
derive analytical conditions for when evolutionary branching and the
tragedy of the commune occurs. The results show that the functional
form of the payoff determines the effect that variability in group
size has on evolutionary dynamics.
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