Review of Governing the Commons (written by E. Ostrom) and
short introduction of inshore fishery management in Jeju Island
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Although the centralization and privatization of natural resource had been accepted as only ways to prevent the ‘tragedy of commons’ they were not always effective in every problem related to resource management. In this book, as an alternative to these solutions forced for several decades, Elinor Ostrom tried to undermine the foundation of their theories on the basis of simple game theoretic examples and empirical studies of successful communal management by resource users--examples of solution to collective action dilemma. She argued that management of commons are not always translated into a simple prisoners dilemma, which means the inevitable tragedy, and a clue can be found in the successful examples to extricate ourselves from the collective action dilemma by changing assumptions that theorists had simply assumed when analyzing resource problems. Ostrom and her colleagues provided the framework for principle design that consists of eight key factors such as conflict resolution mechanisms, clear boundaries and memberships. In this presentation, I will explain the essence of her argumentation briefly and her framework based on empirical studies including successful, unsuccessful examples. Finally, I will introduce inshore fishery management of Jeju island in Korea—my example to help me to understand the framework and to find out my research goal now. |
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