Cooperation is widely observed in various taxonomic groups. Some empirical studies reported that in the cooperative process organisms can often choose their own behavior based on the behaviors of their partners. In such situations, individuals decide their own cooperation level using the "response rule" to the cooperation level of their partners, and we should consider the evolution of the functional shape of response rule in order to consider the evolution of cooperation with such reactional decision-making process.
Previous theoretical studies consider the evolution of response rule by using continuous iterated games or negotiation games. In my previous study, I consider the influence of behavioral error in the cooperative processes by using negotiation game, and I showed that such behavioral error strongly influence on the evolutionary property of response rule.
In this talk, I will talk about the influence of error type on the evolution of reaction in the cooperation. In my previous study, I consider the error of investment in cooperation and it is a constant value during the cooperation with same partner. However, we can consider other types of error in cooperation, e.g., the error of estimation of partner's behavior will be also possible, and the error value may be different for each round of reciprocal interaction rather than each partner. According to my preliminary results, the evolutionary stable response rule is different depending on the type of error.