Takashi Uehara
(Kyushu University)

06/11/30, 13:30 at Room 3631 (6th floor of building 3 of the Faculty of Sciences)

Territory owners guard their territories from intrusions by other territory owners and floaters. It is known that the aggression level of the territory owner to intruders differs depending on the status of the intruder. In earlier times, it is believed that territory owners show low aggression to its territorial neighbors than to floaters and this phenomenon is called “dear enemy effect.” However the reverse cases have found recently and are called “anti-dear enemy effect.” Previous works say the relative threat to the owner from the intruders determines the opposite reactions. In this study I argue the possibility that intrusion benefit and cost for the intruder determine the aggression of the owner by using a simple game model considering the situation in which intrusion level of the intruder and security level of the owner interact each other. Then I show the evolutionary dynamics of intrusion and security.

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